The Tragedy of the Euro
The current self-governing debt crisis in Europe is the direct result of credit expansion by the European banking system. In the early 2000s, credit was expanded, especially in the periphery of the European Monetary Union such as in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Interest rates were reduced substantially by credit expansion, coupled with a fall both in inflationary expectations and risk premiums. The sharp fall in inflationary expectations was caused by the prestige of the newly created European Central Bank as a copy of the Bundesbank. Risk premiums were reduced artificially due to the expected support by stronger nations. The result was an artificial boom. Asset price bubbles, such as a housing bubble in Spain, developed. The newly created money was primarily injected in the countries of the periphery where it financed overconsumption and bad investments, mainly in an overextended automobile and construction sector. At the same time, the credit expansion also helped to finance and expand unsustainable welfare states.
In 2007, the microeconomic effects that reversed any artificial boom financed by credit expansion, and not by genuine real savings, started to show up. Prices of means of production, such as commodities and wages, increased. Interest rates also climbed due to inflationary pressure that made central banks reduce their expansionary stance.
Finally, consumer goods prices started to rise and be relative to the prices offered to the original factors of productions. It became more and more obvious that many investments were not sustainable due to a lack of real savings. Many of these investments occurred in the construction sector. The financial sector came under pressure as mortgages had been securitized,
ending up directly or indirectly on balance sheets of financial institutions. The pressures culminated in the collapse of the investment bank, Lehman Brothers, which led to a full-fledged panic in financial...